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Abstract 
Trust acts as a facilitator for decision making in environments, where decisions are subject to risk and 
uncertainty. Security is one of the factors contributing to the trust model that is a requirement for service 
users. In this paper we ask, What can be done to improve end user trust in choosing a cloud identity 
provider? Security and privacy are central issues in a cloud identity environment and it is the end user 
who determines the amount of trust they have in any identity system. This paper is an in-depth literature 
survey that evaluates identity service delivery in a cloud environment from the perspective of the service 
user. A trust framework is sought that will provide the end user the capability of evaluating the trust 
they may have in any service. The analysis resolves the possibility of a single trust value that gives an 
overall security strength of the cloud identity service. Such a metric can provide informed end user 
choice. Consideration is also given to the decay or enhancement of the trust value based on user 
experience and transactions over a period of time.  
Keywords Trust, Identity, End user, Frameworks, Metrics  
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1 Introduction 
A trust management framework for assessing the trustworthiness of a cloud identity provider can be 
developed that aggregates and manages trust-related information from different sources within and 
without the cloud environment. The proposal is based on the analysis and improvement of existing work, 
and has a systematic design that helps the cloud end users to find the particular provider that fulfils their 
requirements. This work differentiates from previous trust management publications, for example Noor 
et al. (2013), and Roy et al. (2015), by assessing trust for cloud identity management from the perspective 
of the end-user. Noor et al., (2016) argue that trust and reputation are indispensable conditions for the 
social conviviality in human societies. Cloud federation environments has similar conditions for 
interaction where cloud users can join and leave an identity provider frequently. , However, traditional 
trust solutions have structural difficulties when applied to a cloud environment (Habib, Hauke, Ries, & 
Mühlhäuser, 2012). Due to the subjective and context-sensitive nature of trust the selection of a cloud 
provider with fully trusted and appropriate services is one of the most challenging issues in the multi-
tenant cloud environment (Ray, Ray, & Chakraborty, 2009). Often Cloud providers have many services 
that are hosted and tiered for multiple users. As a consequence there can be a variation of services by 
the one provider. All of these matters impact upon an end user trust level and the decision for use.  
Further complications arise as the end user looks for evidence on which to make a decision. Trust 
relationships between entities in cloud computing are dynamic, uncertain and hard to quantify 
(Pearson, 2013). The decision maker has to take ownership of the risk and to draw a judgement based 
on wide variation. The Trust models for cloud identity providers often do not allow for such uncertainty 
and require improvement by increasing the number of specific attributes taken into account that are 
relevant when selecting cloud identity providers (Shaikh & Sasikumar, 2015). Common decisions tend 
to choose the most credible node under one single factor, but ignore the other factors that provide 
evidence of actual transactions. Such decision-making often lacks a mechanism to evaluate different 
cloud entities’ different quality of service (QoS) requirements (Zheng, Wu, Zhang, Lyu, & Wang, 2013). 
Furthermore, cloud has many unique features compared to traditional environments that require tools 
for evaluation before trustworthy evidence can be accumulated, evaluated, and decisions made. In this 
sense there is a gap to be filled with regard to evidence available to end users for decision-making in 
cloud environments.  
Central to the concern is how to compare each Cloud service based on an agreed set of attributes, and 
then how to quantify and aggregate them with a meaningful metric (Oliveira et al., 2014). The 
combination of information from different sources demands multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) 
(Ramesh & Zionts, 2013). This often requires decision-makers to choose or rank alternatives on the basis 
of an evaluation of several criteria. Hence, decision making involves managing trade-offs or 
compromises among a number of criteria that are in conflict with each other (Garg, Versteeg, & Buyya, 
2013). The method is related to how much customization should be supported and where the trust values 
should be aggregated. In the case of QoS, several challenges are found in constructing the model for 
evaluation and ranking of Cloud identity providers. To establish and measure a Cloud Identity 
Measurement Index (CIMI) a set of attributes requires continuous updating and adjustment for 
variation over time. However, without having precise measurement models for each attribute, it is not 
possible to compare different CSMI. The second challenge is how to rank the Cloud identity based on 
CIMI attributes. There are two types of QoS requirements which a user can have: functional and non-
functional. Some of them cannot be measured easily given the nature of the Cloud environments. 
Attributes like security and user experience are difficult to quantify. Moreover, to decide which service 
matches with all the functional and non-functional requirements is a decision problem. It is necessary 
to think critically before selection, apply the multiple criteria and preserve the independence of 
relationships. Subsequently, the assigning of weights to trust attributes is necessary in the building of a 
trust model (Benlian & Hess, 2011). 
This introduction section has scoped the problem context and the remainder of the paper is structured 
to define cloud computing and its related Security, trust and privacy issues. Cloud identity management 
is then review so that trust models and their mechanisms may be evaluated. To conclude, sixteen 
currently available trust frameworks are analysed to deliver potential solutions for a singular metric and 
an end user system architecture for decision-making. 
2 Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing integrates various computing technologies to provide services to the end users (Wei et 
al., 2014). Efficient use of businesses resources is one of the main advantages of cloud computing. The 
charging of the “pay as you use” model is an attractive option for businesses who wish to reduce the cost 
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of assets and related personnel costs (Aleem & Ryan Sprott, 2012). Cloud computing permits services to 
be marketed independent of technologies and vendor’s so that an end user may efficiently and 
economically choose, which and what service best suits them (Ali, Khan, & Vasilakos, 2015). The price 
driver of cloud computing has impacted on even the more recent business models and has initiated fresh 
rounds of restructuring. The global reach of such opportunities has brought with it concerns regarding 
security, privacy, monitoring, and trust. These challenges are being taken up by the research community, 
and solutions are being made available for industry and end users that have negotiated an optimal 
payback from the resources being invested. A full review of these issues and analysis may be found in 
Ardqggna & Etisalat (2015).  
The NIST definition (NIST, 2013) of cloud computing is widely used to define the concept. In figure 1 
the cloud computing scope has four separate descriptions of service provisioning which are common 
characteristics, essential characteristics, service models, and deployment models.  
 
 Figure1: Deployment descriptions for cloud (NIST, 2013) 
The five essential features of cloud computing differentiate the concept from traditional grid computing 
by including the scope of Broad network access. This essential characteristic opens the computing grid 
to a World Wide Web of services. The concept makes available resource pooling, and on-demand self-
service, within an economic model that is termed Measured Service. The NIST definition provides a 
scope of what to expect in cloud computing. However the way the definition is interpreted and 
implemented is entirely up to a service provider. This is where the key issues and challenges arise. To 
the end user each of these essential characteristics are desirable and useful for economic advantage. 
However the service provider has to also act in their own interest to maintain their business in the face 
of competition and technical challenges. The result can be that the end user may not experience the 
service they expect. In addition to the NIST description scope, others have developed deployment 
models that best suit their conception of a commercial opportunity. For example, Alhamazani et al. 
(2015) described one particular approach named Anything-as-a-Service (XaaS) , which refers to the fact 
that cloud systems are able to support and offer anything, or everything, in the form of services, ranging 
from large resources to personal, specific, and granular requirements. Examples include Trust-as-a-
Service (TaaS), Identity-as-a-Service (IDaaS), Data-as-a-Service (DaaS), Routing-as-a-Service (RaaS), 
and Security-as-a-Service (SecaaS). The implication of these developments is for a growing scope of what 
may be described as cloud computing. The NIST (2013) definition provides adequate scope to be robust 
in the face of an unfolding concept.  
2.1 Cloud Security Issues 
Cloud security increases the complexity of traditional computing systems protection by adding multiple 
layers of design and potential opportunity for vulnerability (Goode et al., 2015). The standard CIA 
criteria are still required. This implies that a combination of confidentiality, in the prevention of the 
unauthorized disclosure of information, is required. Integrity, and the prevention of the unauthorized 
amendment or deletion of information, is required. Similarly the Availability of services and the 
prevention of the unauthorized withholding of information, is also required (Cabarcos et al., 2012).  
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Bezzi, Kalavan & Sabetta (2011) resolved security issues in cloud computing environments into six sub-
categories, which include:  
• How to provide safety mechanisms to monitor or trace the cloud server. 
• How to keep data confidentiality for individuals and sensitivity. 
• How to avoid a malicious insider’s illegal operations through the potential lack of 
transparency into provider process and procedure environments. 
• How to avoid service hijacking, where phishing, fraud and exploitation are well known 
issues in IT 
• How to manage multi-instances in multi-tenancy virtual environments, when all instances 
are assumed isolated from each other. However, the assumption breaks down when 
attackers are able to cross virtual machines. Using side channels they can escape the 
boundaries of the sandboxed environment and have full access to a host.  
• How to develop appropriate law and implement legal jurisdiction, so that users have a chain 
of evidence against their providers when required. 
The survey by Aleem & Sprott, (2012) showed that the top concerns for organizations regarding cloud 
computing were security, governance and a lack of control over service availability. The survey 
highlighted that the majority of IT professionals were not aware that some CSPs currently control the 
decryption keys that enable them to decrypt their client’s data. It could be considered as a major security 
concern and it is one of the factors that should be looked into at service level agreement (SLA) level. 
Data loss and leakage were nominated as the top threat to cloud computing by respondents; this was 
followed by account, service and traffic hijacking.  
2.2 Cloud Privacy Issues 
Privacy is the ability of an individual or group to control themselves or information about themselves 
and thereby reveal themselves selectively. Privacy issues in cloud computing environments can be 
divided into three sub-categories, which include (Nepal & Pathan, 2014): 
• When a subject may be more concerned about the current or future information being revealed 
than information from the past. 
• When a user may be comfortable if friends can manually request his information, but may not 
want alerts sent automatically. 
• A Cloud user may rather have the information reported as an ambiguous region rather than a 
precise point.  
In addition, the privacy issues differ according to different cloud scenarios (Xiao & Xiao, 2013), and can 
be divided into four subcategories as follows: 
• How to make users remain control over their data when it is stored and processed in the cloud, 
and avoid theft, nefarious use and unauthorized resale. 
• How to guarantee data replications are in a fixed jurisdiction, a consistent state, and has no data 
loss, leakage and unauthorized modification or fabrication. 
• Identification of the party that is responsible for ensuring legal requirements for personal 
information. 
• Cloud sub-contractors involved in processing can be identified, checked and verified. 
 
2.3 Cloud Trust Issues 
Trust is a measurable belief that utilizes experience, to make decisions. It is used in social science in 
constructing a human relationship and is now an essential substitute for forming security 
mechanisms in distributed computing environments. It has many soft security attributes, such as, 
reliability, dependability, confidence, honesty, belief, trustfulness, security, competence, and so on 
(Manuel, 2015). The security concern has different levels of trust in the different deployment models 
of cloud computing, due to the difference levels of trust among the communicating parties (Shaikh 
& Sasikumar, 2015). Trust in the private cloud computing model is expected to be at the highest 
level as the infrastructure and the assets will be managed and used by specific and well-known 
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entities. In the community cloud computing model, the cloud consumers (CCs) are from different 
organizations, and they will have the same level of security requirements. The trust level here may 
be lesser than the trust level in the private cloud, yet it is still better than the public cloud model. 
The problem of trust is in the public cloud computing model, in which the communication entities 
are unknown to each other is critical for transaction. However, it is the service provider’s 
responsibility to build trust with its clients. Trust is the most complex relationship among entities 
because it is extremely subjective, context-dependent, non-symmetric, uncertain, and partially 
transitive (Chann & Chieu, 2010). Trust evaluation is a multi-faceted and multi-phased 
phenomenon based on multi-dimensional factors and the trust evaluation cycle. It is used to find 
the answer to the question “With which service providers should I interact and with which I should 
not?”  
Trust issues in cloud computing environments can be divided into four sub-categories (Bezzi, 
Kalavuri & Sabetta, (2011) which include:  
• How to define and evaluate trust according to the unique attributes in cloud computing 
environments. 
• How to handle malicious information when trust relationships in clouds are temporary and 
dynamic. 
• How to consider and provide a different security level for service according to the trust 
degree. 
• How to manage trust degree change with interaction time and context, and to monitor, 
adjust, and to accurately reflect the trust relationship dynamic. 
2.4 Cloud Monitoring Issues 
Cloud Computing has a number of positive aspects pushing for its rapid adoption, from both the 
economic and the technical perspectives (Tormo, Marmol & Perez, 2012). The Cloud provides a 
lower Total Cost of Ownership, and increased flexibility in terms of both resources and Service Level 
Agreements. It allows for the focusing on the core business, by ignoring the costs related to 
infrastructure management. It also provides an improved scalability, ubiquitous access to data and 
resources, and advanced disaster recovery mechanisms. Together with these positive aspects Cloud 
Computing has a number of challenges for which the research community and industry are investing 
resources. Monitoring issues in cloud computing environments can be divided into four sub-
categories (Dondio & Longo, 2011). The requirement is for accurate and fine-grained monitoring, 
platforms and measurement techniques. 
• How to best monitor and measure provision of scalability, load balancing, Quality of Service 
(QoS), service continuity and application performance. 
• How to guarantee SLAs. 
• How to realize best measurement for management of large scale, complex and federated 
infrastructures. 
• How to evaluate the root causes of end-to-end performance. 
3 Cloud Identity 
Effective cloud management recognises the need to use identity and advanced identity management 
mechanisms to overcome many of the issues noted in section 2. Identity management systems provide 
authentication and authorization based on end user identities. They keep privacy, while at the same time 
provide interoperability across multiple domains. Traditional identity management systems allow the 
end users, to some extent, to manage their personal information for accessing certain services. However, 
cloud computing brings a different perspective related to the end users’ interests. Additionally, end users 
are more concerned about who can access their data. Identity management systems have been shown to 
be secure and efficient in diverse contexts and scenarios. By establishing trust relationships between 
providers and domains, identity management systems offer a huge range of features both for end users 
and for organizations regarding controlling and exchanging identity-related information while 
maintaining the privacy (Fang et al., 2012). 
The user-centricity and privacy-preserving features offered by identity management systems, are key 
elements in cloud computing environments. Cloud computing integrates technologies and concepts 
from other fields, such as multi party computation, distributed systems, federation, and so on; and hence 
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some of the issues have already been addressed in other contexts, where identity management systems 
have been widely accepted (Fito & Guitant, 2014). Nevertheless, cloud computing brings a different 
perspective related to the end users interests, and delivers new risks for end user identities. Additionally, 
end users are more concerned about how their data is managed, where it is located and who can access 
it. In this sense, cloud computing is changing some of the basic assumptions (Fournaris & Keramidas, 
2014). 
To ensure the security of critical and sensitive data for customers the trust between Cloud identity 
providers has to be established before redirecting the customer's requests from one identity provider to 
another provider. Among all the cloud security issues, the ability to generate a trust value metric for 
identity management in the cloud is the most helpful to the end user. It is desirable that the users in one 
domain are able to access applications hosted in other clouds when a trust relationship already exists 
between the two cloud environments. Therefore, functionalities to manage the flow of user identity 
across clouds or domains are required. For this reason, a robust identity management (authentication, 
authorization and attribute data) must be put in place for cloud deployment and interaction in a usable 
and secure way. Likewise, the need for better access control and identity management systems as a main 
target for Federated Identity Management (FIM) plays a vital role in allowing the global scalability that 
is required for the successful implantation of cloud technologies. Current FIM frameworks are limited 
by the relative complexity of the underlying trust models and the complexity of the problem. Current 
FIM systems lack mechanisms to achieve dynamic federation, which is still an open challenge that 
requires further investigation (Garg et al., 2013). Thus, the establishment of dynamic federations 
between the different cloud identity actors is still a major theoretical challenge that has remained 
unsolved. 
3.1 Cloud Identity Management System 
Identity management systems were designed with the aim of providing an access control architecture, 
capable of preserving the users’ privacy and enabling Single Sign-On by establishing trust relationships 
between different organizations.  Shibboleth (Ghazizadeh, et al. (2014) and Liberty Alliance (Habib et 
al., 2012) are widely extended examples of identity management systems. In these systems, users’ 
information is stored on reliable entities, named identity providers. Identity providers are in charge of 
managing users’ identities, releasing required information to external entities. Service providers 
delegate the authentication process to identity providers, which in turn respond by sending the users’ 
information on successful authentication. Additionally, they enable Single Sign-On, allowing users to 
access different services using their unique account. A set of commonly used mechanisms are reviewed 
below. The different approaches show the benefits of each in regards to the cloud identity system access. 
The federation establishment requires a metadata provider exchange; where the metadata contains 
identifiers, public key certificates, and service attributes. They are used for the location and secure 
communication between provider services. This decoupling between providers enables that IdPs can 
support many SPs in a distributed fashion, and also focus on managing identities, access control policies, 
and security token issuing.  
The OAuth mechanism defines a protocol in order for clients to access server resources on behalf of a 
resource owner (Habib et al., 2012). It provides a process for end users to authorize third-party accesses 
to their server resources without sharing their credentials. Windows CardSpacealso known as its 
codename InfoCard, is the Microsoft client or Identity Selector for the Identity Metasystem (Habiba et 
al., 2014). Taking into consideration that the end users may have different identities depending on the 
context where they are interacting, the challenge of this approach is to allow the end users to create, use, 
and manage their diverse digital identities in an understandable and effective way. The idea behind 
Windows CardSpace is that end users could manage their digital identities, and their related attributes, 
in a similar way that they manage their cards in their wallets. When end users create an account in an 
OpenID identity provider, they receive an identifier as a URL or XRI. Then, when they access a relying 
party or service provider website which requires authentication and supports OpenID, they may enter 
their identifier in order to be redirected to their OpenID provider (Kanwal et al., 2014).  
Yang et al. (2010) have an open source identity framework designed to enhance the end user experience, 
by integrating identity profiles and social relationships information across multiple sites. It not only 
manages end users’ attributes, but it also manages data flows to external businesses and to other end 
users’ personal data service. Luhmann (2000) is a cryptographic technology which presents a type of 
credential or token to encode end users’ attributes in such a way that the issuance and the presentation 
of such tokens remains un-linkable. The technology makes use of Zero-knowledge proof methods to 
issue the tokens so that an end user can prove possession of a certain piece of information without 
revealing the information. Luo et al. (2012) is an anonymous credential system following the protocols 
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in order to allow the end users to control the dissemination of personal information and preserving their 
privacy. It allows where an end user can obtain credentials containing attested attributes from identity 
providers, and prove to a service provider the validity of such attributes without revealing any other 
information. OpenID Connect (Manuel, 2015) is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. 
It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an 
Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the end user in an 
interoperable and accurate manner. The functionality and workflow is shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: OpenID Connect General workflow (Manuel, 2015, p.14) 
In the common workflow of SAML (Needleman, 2004), an end user wants to access a service from a 
service provider, but this service provider needs to authenticate the end user and obtain some attributes 
about the user. The authentication process, instead of being performed by the service provider, is 
delegated to the identity provider, which is in charge of managing the user’s identity. 
4 Trust Model and Mechanisms 
Security is the dominant term when it comes to protection of sensitive data, but trust is a much stronger 
concept that goes beyond confidentiality, availability, integrity, and nonrepudiation (the basic security 
pillars). Trust formulates a good-faith relationship between computing machines as well as between 
their users. From the IT perspective, trust is not only about securing the communication channel or 
authenticating the data sender but also on trusting that the sent information are legitimate, they do not 
include malicious codes and they will not harm the receiver in an unforeseen way. In other words, trust 
extends to the sender itself by believing that they will obey to specific communication rules and will not 
abuse communication by non-responsiveness or selfish behavior (Napal & Pathan, 2014). 
Trust and Reputation Rahman & Hailes (1998) are two indisputably recognised and relevant factors in 
human societies. Studies of trust have been carried out in different fields: psychology, sociology, 
economy and philosophy. Computational models of trust emerged in the last decade with the aim of 
exploiting the human notion of trust in open and decentralized environments. According to Noor & 
Sheng (2011), trust is adopted by humans to decrease the complexity of the society we are living by using 
delegation. Trust has emerged as a key element in decision-support solutions by helping agents in the 
selection of good and trustworthy collaborative partners, in the identification of reliable pieces of 
information or as part of soft-security applications. Trust is a concept borrowed from the human society 
and has different definitions in different fields. Properties of trust also vary from context to context. 
Here are some extracted properties commonly applied in computer science. Trust, in general, is not 
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transitive (non-transitive). Namely, if agent A trusts B and B trusts C, it is not possible to conclude that 
A also trusts C. However, under some conditions, A can trust C (Pagliere & Castlelfranchi, 2014). 
Secondly, trust is typically asymmetric. A member may trust another member more than she (he) is 
trusted back. However, when both parties are trustworthy, they will come to a high mutual trust level 
after repeated interactions. Conversely, if one of the members does not act in a trustworthy manner, the 
other member will be forced to penalize him/her, leading to low mutual trust. Asymmetry can be 
considered a particular case of personalization (Paglieri, 2013). Thirdly, trust value may change over 
time as a dynamic factor. The most recent value of trust is more informative and persuasive in decision-
making. Due to the dynamic behaviour of agents, the trustworthiness of an agent may change over time. 
Thus, it needs to be updated. Fourthly, trust is subjective and self-reinforcing dynamic which means 
when a cloud user chooses to trust or distrust a provider, it is a personal choice. Each user has its own 
preference or interests (subjectivity) that influence their trust reasoning (Qu, Wang & Orgun, 2013). 
Finally, trust is context-aware. It means different scenarios have different types of trust (Radha & Reddy, 
2012).  
A typical computational trust solution follows the high-level architecture shown in (Sakimura et al., 
2014). In a typical distributed environment, an agent (trustier) is acting in a domain where the trustier 
needs to trust other agents or objects, whose ability and reliability are unknown. The trustier agent 
queries the trust system to gather more knowledge about the trustee agent and in order to better ground 
decisions. A trust-based decision in a specific domain is a multi-stage process. The first step is the 
identification and selection of the appropriate input data. These data are in general domain-specific and 
identified through an analysis conducted over the application.  
Evidence selection is driven by an underlying trust model that contains the notion of trust on which the 
entire system is centred. A trust model represents the intelligence used to justify which elements are 
selected as trust evidence, why some elements are selected and other discarded, and it informs the 
computation over the selected evidence. A trust model contains the definition of the notion of trust, its 
dynamics, how it evolves over time and with new evidences, and the mechanisms of trust used in the 
computation. After evidence selection, a trust computation is performed over evidence to produce trust 
values. This is the estimation of the trustworthiness of entities in a particular domain. A trust 
computation requires the formalization of a computable version of those mechanisms defined in the 
trust model. Examples of such mechanisms are the past-outcomes, reputation and recommendation, 
but also temporal and social factors, similarity, and categorization. For instance, a classical trust system 
uses two sets of evidence: recommendations and past experience. Each of them is quantified separately 
and then aggregated into a final value. In this final aggregation stage, exogenous factors such as risk and 
trustier’ s disposition can also be considered. The output is presented as quantitative trust values and as 
a set of justifications.  
4.1 Evaluation of System Architecture  
The components of the trust framework adapted from Shaikh & Sasikumar, (2013) are in figure 3. In 
order to generate successful collaborated applications, a trust mechanism is incorporated. A node’s trust 
value is assessed based on direct observations and indirect information from recommendations. The 
trust of one node toward another node is updated upon an encounter and interaction events. Each node 
will execute the trust protocol independently and will perform its direct trust assessment toward an 
encountered node based on specific detection mechanisms designed for assessing the trust property. 
This framework provides features such as service selection based on trust requirements and ranking of 
distributed computing based on previous user experiences and real time performance. The key elements 
are: 
• Cloud entities: This component is responsible for interaction with customers and 
understanding their application needs, and performs discovery and ranking of suitable 
trusted services using other components such as the trust management, direct/indirect trust 
and evaluation method.  
• Monitoring and history information: this component first discovers services that can satisfy 
users’ needs. Then, it closely monitors the trust performance of the services, such as direct 
and indirect trust. At the same time, related history records are stored in service database. 
• Computing service network structure and catalogue: builds the service network and their 
features advertised by various different providers, divides computing resources into 
different classes. 
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Figure 3: Service Trust Evaluation System Architecture (adapted from Shaikh & Sasikumar, 2013) 
4.2 Trust Establishment 
The taxonomies for functional and non-functional features in a trust model (Schryen et al., 2011) can be 
used as an assessment criterion to evaluate the existing trust models in the Cloud domain. The non-
functional features include, security, performance, control, and deployment of the model. The functional 
features include the agreements made, certificates issued, feedback given, domain of operation, and the 
subjectivity of the decision-making model. Service level agreement (SLA) based trust model (STM) 
(Shaikh & Sasikumar, 2013) and Trust model for security aware Cloud (TMSAW) (Shaikh & Sasikumar, 
2015) are two examples of the agreement-based trust models which the SLA plays a primary role in trust 
evaluation of cloud service providers. In the STM, the SLA agents are responsible for asserting the 
required parameters of encryption and key management, hence providing data confidentiality. The SLA-
management module in SLA-agent is responsible for creating and negotiating the access control policies 
for data stored in the Cloud, thus guaranteeing the data ownership to customers. This model does not 
encounter any procedure to assure the process execution control, which is an important attribute for 
elevating the trust level on a CSP. In addition, the SLA-agent manages and inserts the necessary 
parameters for data replication in SLAs, thus assuring data availability. The Trust management module 
collects feedback (from external Cloud providers) that is used to analyse the QoS transparency offered 
by a specific CSP. Detection of malicious entities is obtained via credibility weights, which are assigned 
to the sources of information and the aggregated value is calculated. SLA-agents need to design and 
select the required parameters for the SLAs while creation and management related tasks are performed 
by the CSP. The functionality of the model can be enhanced by introducing a new module that can be 
easily integrated with SLA reports to obtain better and more reliable trust values, and high flexibility. 
The STM does not support a dynamic update of the SLA parameters and is, therefore, considered to be 
passive for the Cloud environment. The model is capable of evaluating the Cloud services, but does not 
facilitate the trust evaluation of the Cloud consumers and therefore, does not support the dual root of 
trust. Nevertheless, the parameter monitoring module of the SLA agent continuously observes and 
monitors the SLA attributes to avoid any inconsistency and inaccuracy in the trust score formulation. 
Ahmed et al. have proposed a Ticket-based trust model (TTM) to establish trust on the Cloud providers. 
TTMs are issued by the data owner for authorized users, where capability lists (user-id, data-id, access 
rights AR) define the access rights of users on data stored on the Cloud, thus assuring the data ownership 
offered by the CSP. The model does not provide any mechanism to ensure the process execution control 
in the Cloud. Likewise, no mechanism is adopted to evaluate the QoS transparency presented by the 
CSP. A Certification-based trust model (CTM) [48] does not provide any mechanism to assure the 
process execution control and the QoS transparency. Moreover, the dynamic composition of services 
introduces high complexity in implementation of the discovery framework. The required number of 
Cloud services can be examined and validated from the certificates issued by accreditation authorities, 
thus introducing high flexibility in the model. Moreover, the framework can select the Cloud service 
accredited by third parties to satisfy the data replication that assures data availability. 
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5 Trust Frameworks 
Selecting the best cloud service from the available cloud providers is a complex and challenging task for 
the cloud users. There is a multitude of works that employ optimization to achieve this goal. However 
they limit the applicability of the method to generalise and usually require select input data that 
structures a view of a current situation. Other models are required that can compensate for many of the 
ambiguity is found in cloud environments. For the end user to identify trustworthy cloud services is 
difficult because much of the evidence is not available to them. Consequently the concept of the trust 
framework in which generalise guidelines and specific metrics are found can be a useful tool in this type 
of decision-making. Table 1 provides an analysis from literature of trust frameworks into six categories: 
risk, authentication, security, accuracy, integration, and privacy. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of existing cloud trust frameworks (Mnemonics in text) 
The first category of analysis is risk. Different trust frameworks supply a different conception and 
methodologies for the calculation of risk. For example, the approaches can be grouped under the three 
risk assessment methods: quantitative (QN), qualitative (QL), and semi-quantitative (QQ). The second 
category for analysis is Authentication (A). These mechanisms are used to establish consumers’ 
identities when registering for a service. The analysis of these mechanisms give evidence on which to 
make a trust based decision. The third category is Security (S). The security mechanisms employed by a 
cloud service also hint at its trustworthiness. An assessment requires appropriate security mechanisms 
at both the access control (SA) and communication (SC) levels. Privacy (P) is another factor in 
determining the trustworthiness of a service. Knowing a cloud service’s privacy policy can help 
determine whether to trust that service with essential data. Based on SLAs, privacy responsibility can be 
split between the provider (PP), who deploys all necessary security measures, and consumers (PC), who 
take their own steps to preserve data privacy. The fourth criteria is Accuracy.  The accuracy of trust 
assessment depends on both the correct identification of trust feedback and effective assessment 
function security. Poor identification of trust feedback (AF) and/or failure to prevent attackers (AA) 
from manipulating trust results can lead to inaccurate results in trust management systems. Combining 
several techniques like reputation and recommendations can increase trust results’ accuracy; Integrity 
Trust Framework Risk Authenticati
on 
Security Accuracy Integration Privacy 
 
Fang, et al., 2012. QL A SC,SA N N N 
Tanimoto et al., 
2011. 
QL N SA N N PP.PC 
Theoharidou et al., 
2013. 
QQ N SC N N PC 
Tormo et al., 2014. QQ A SC,SA N N PP,PC 
Vullers & Alpar, 
2013. 
QL N SA N N N 
Wagle et al., 2015. QL Ni SA,SC AF,AA N PC 
Wang et al., 2015. QQ N SA,SC AF,AA I PC 
Wei et al., 2014. N N SC N I PP 
Aleem & Sprott, 
2012. 
QL N SA,SC N N PP 
Lyaniv & 
Kleinberger, 2000. 
N N SA,SC N I PP 
Yeluri & Leon, 2014. N N SC N N N 
Zhuang et al., 2012. N A SA,SC N N PP 
Zhuang et al., 2010. QL A SA N N N 
Schryen et al., 2011. N N SC AF I PP 
Zheng et al., 2013. N N SC AF I N 
Qu et al., 2013 N N SC AF I N 
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(I) may also lead to better trust results by matching appropriate consumers to trustworthy providers 
(Toromo, Marmol & Perez, 2014).  
These criteria have been used to evaluate representative trust management systems for cloud computing 
and related areas such as grid, P2P, and service-oriented computing. The analysis yielded several open 
research challenges. Cloud users are the real owner of the data assets, thus, ignoring their business 
objective will result in an inaccurate evaluation of cloud provider trust level. The most popular risk 
assessment standards, such as NIST SP800-30 assume that an organization’s assets are fully managed 
by the organization itself. This is not the case for cloud computing model. Moreover, a big problem today 
is that, all too often, different CSPs or CIdPs employ their own jargon to describe risk, while at the same 
time measuring its impact and the probability that it will manifest itself is expressed in a subjective 
fashion. Therefore, as a starting point, risk assessment will bring a common framework for managing 
different types of risk in the same way.  
6 Discussion 
Cloud computing involves many security risks, which may require the re-evaluation against a new set of 
criteria. Therefore, security risk assessment in cloud computing requires further research to develop an 
appropriate risk assessment methodology. For scalability reasons, trust relationships between the CIdP, 
CIdU, CSP should be assessed as on-demand instead of statically. Such a move would bring quality 
improvement to the methods currently applied for Cloud identity. However, there is a high uncertainty 
component when deciding whether to cooperate or not with unknown providers. Hence, there is an 
ongoing project to identify the risks associated with the Cloud computing paradigm. Risks associated 
with the virtualization technology, such as failures in multi-tenancy, virtual machine (VM) isolation, and 
hypervisor vulnerabilities; loss of direct control of resources and software such as provider lock-in, 
decreased reliability since providers may go out of business, agreement (SLA) breaches; risks associated 
with data such as data protection responsibility, insecure or incomplete data deletion; and legal risks 
such as regulatory compliance, data location, and the effect of international boundaries on operation: 
are some of the risks that cloud computing has introduced. Thus, every CIdU has to make decisions that 
imply dealing with some form of risk. CIdU may request evidence to determine if it is secure to 
collaborate with a particular unknown CIdPs.  
The end user trust can be improved when choosing an identity service by greater transparency and 
clarity on the part of the CIdP. Similarly, a CSP has to decide if it is sufficiently secure to accept 
authentication statements or other identity data issued by a specific CIdP. It is also crucial that users are 
aware of the transactions regarding their identity. In fact, they should be provided with risk information 
to determine if they should reveal their personal data to the CSP or CIdP. Public-key infrastructure 
(PKI), access management services, Rule-based access control, password based protection, and Secure 
Shell (SSH) are examples for cloud authentication from which vital evidence may be gained to populate 
the trust model. Further differentiation is required of the applicability of trust assessment functions for 
each service provider. A greater number of authentication types equates with a high level of trust.    
Most of the trust models reviewed do not use any mechanism to identify authentic trust feedback. This 
is a significant challenge in the cloud because of the overlapping interactions between service providers 
and consumers. Also most of the trust management systems have been analyzed do not have a 
mechanism to preserve participants’ privacy, highlighting the urgent need for efficient techniques that 
protect users’ privacy while minimizing the impact to system performance. Importantly, most of the 
trust management systems examined do not support the integration of trust feedback for the end user 
to view. Techniques that can efficiently integrate trust feedback is needed to improve trust results. Again 
most of the trust management systems that have been evaluated do not provide security at the access 
control and communication level. However, attacks can come from system users themselves. The 
situation is accentuated in cloud environments due to the dynamic interactions and the distributed 
nature of cloud services, which make it difficult to identify attackers. Mitigation techniques are required 
to enhance end user trust. Some of the works, compared the low-level performance metrics of Cloud 
services such as CPU utilization and network throughput. Such low-level performance metrics can be 
further used to create models of high-level system properties, such as power consumption and 
performance. Weightings can be added to reflect each service provider protective mechanism capability 
and the provision of the different attributes such as security, privacy, and performance measurements.  
Considerable literature exists on trust models in Cloud computing that evaluates the trust of Cloud 
services. The detailed analysis concludes that all the trust models in Cloud computing are mainly 
designed to evaluate the trust between Cloud CS and CSPs. None of these trust models focus on 
evaluation and establishment of trust in the inter-Cloud domain; thus the Cloud federation lacks trust 
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evaluation approaches and techniques. After analysing these trust models, it is further concluded that 
trust evaluation should not be based on single factor (feedback, SLA or recommendation) rather a trust 
value should be the aggregation of these different factors. Keeping in view the potential growth of Cloud 
federation and the need for trust evaluation model to achieve the trusted federation (Kanwal, Masood, 
& Shibli, 2014), a trust evaluation model that is based on two essential factors of feedback and QoP 
attributes in SLAs is required. From this model a single metric may be generated for end user trust. 
As an outcome for the literature survey, it is noted at there are few research articles that focus on the 
evaluation of cloud identity providers or on finding appropriate solutions to establish confidence and 
trust between the consumers and the cloud identity provider. The implications for trust frameworks are 
that the start on any proposal will be with an inadequate literature foundation. Guidelines for evaluating 
trust in the cloud environment need to begin with a fresh assessment of the context and a recognition of 
the differences between a cloud environment context and all previous computing contexts, including 
grid networks. 
At present there are no unified standards or metric frameworks that span the cloud context. The 
evaluation of trust, the building of trust models, and the design of trust frameworks can decrease the 
complexity of the cloud environment by delegating decision-making to measurable attributes within the 
systems framework. To evaluate the trust of service nodes scientifically needs a new framework and 
evaluation method to determine the weight of different indexes, and fully reflect the objectivity and 
accuracy in cloud authentication contexts. The outstanding problem is that current research of trust 
evaluation is still in its infancy, and it still has a considerable problem space to explore and to resolve. 
The end user requires less information and more evidence that their information is secure. The required 
evidence is a holistic grouping from multiple factors that is to be accessible for decision-making. A whole 
evaluation framework for trust evaluation, is required which can help users choose and to monitor the 
cloud identity provider states and demonstrations of trusted behavior. Some of the metrics would 
include trust effectiveness measures such as uncertainty, aggregation and customization. Moreover, 
there is no framework that can allow CIdUs to evaluate CIdPs services and rank them based on their 
ability to meet the CIdU’s requirements. A Cloud trust framework is a desirable innovation but 
challenges still remained for security, privacy, access control, and integration; and these continue to be 
major weaknesses inhibiting cloud end user decision making. 
7 Conclusion 
The end user of Cloud services requires greater evidence on which to base trusting decisions regarding 
service supply. The complexity of the situation is compounded by the nature of the cloud environment 
that allows a service supplier to move between contractual arrangements and jurisdictions regardless of 
where the end user may be located. In the literature reviewed a gap was identified around the evaluation 
of trust and its attributes in Cloud services. Several solutions were reviewed that provide metrics to 
determine the credibility of trust in cloud environments. The trust value metric is particularly useful 
once the assessment methodology is a formalized. The focus on cloud identity was selected as this is a 
key area where privacy and security are critical. The unpredictable number of cloud service consumers 
and highly dynamic nature of cloud environments accentuate the problem of intercommunicating 
obstacles occurring among CIdPs and CIdUs. The evidence an end user looks for, can be compiled from 
a fair assessment of service provider attributes and their security mechanisms. Trust-based modelling 
provides a solution from which a trust framework may be developed to assure a trustworthy foundation 
for decision-making. Further research is required into optimal framework architectures, the assessment 
criteria and the adequacy of feedback and review loops. Also the composition of trust models ought to 
be open for evaluation so the relative strengths and weaknesses of each may be reported to the end user 
as part of the evidence on which decisions may be made.   
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